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Abstract
This paper solves a second-best problem where a government has
in particular to choose whether to tax financial inflows (capital con-
trols) or not, and when. A multi-stage optimal control technique is
used to this end. First, it is shown that it is optimal to switch in finite
time from capital controls to full financial liberalization (zero tax on
capital inflows) whenever a measure of total wealth is above a cer-
tain threshold. In particular, a too large initial debt makes financial
liberalization sub-optimal. Second, our analysis suggests that capital
controls should be used countercyclically: booms should be responded
by more financial liberalization while recessions should rather lead to
more stringent capital controls. Third, when public expenditure is
chosen in order to maximize social welfare, financial liberalization is
not unaffordable only for poor countries, even wealthy countries might
find it optimal to implement capital controls if they aim to keep a large
amount of public expenditure. In short, the preservation of the welfare
states might require a more frequent use of capital controls.
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1 Introduction
The recent turmoil in the eurozone, originating in the massive public
debts of the country members, and the associated inexorable contagion phe-
nomenon have led many researchers and practitioners to come back to the
basics. In particular, the “trilemma” principle inherent to the traditional
Mundell-Fleming model (Mundell, 1963), i.e fixed exchange rate, perfect
capital mobility and independent monetary policy cannot all coexist, has re-
covered all its relevance in the more recent related literature (see the excellent
survey of Gallagher, 2012). As a corollary, capital controls are re-emerging
as a potential valuable tool in the face of financial and economic instabil-
ity triggered by financial globalization. Several countries in the world have
already taken this step: for example, Brazil has introduced a tax on interna-
tional capital inflows from october 2009; Taiwan, South Corea and Thailand,
among others, have also managed to limit these inflows.
Beside the recent events, there is now a widely shared view that full
financial integration is not necessarily beneficial for all countries in all cir-
cumstances. In particular, it has been shown that the impact of financial
globalization on economic growth depends on the countries and time spans
under scrutiny (see among others, Kose et al., 2009). More recently, Aizen-
man et al. (2011) have performed a thorough empirical analysis of the im-
pact of the recent financial crisis on the economic growth on 100 countries
from 1990 to 2010, using a disaggregated data on capital flows (inflows vs
outflows, FDIs, equity investment, short-term debts...etc). Among several
highly interesting findings, they have identified a negative growth effect of
short-term debt and a definitely worse performance of countries with weak
institutions and larger short-term debt in the crisis period. The latter finding
is consistent with the conclusion of Kose et al. (2009) according to whom
financial liberalization promotes growth only in countries which are already
above a certain institutional threshold. On the theoretical ground, while
there are obvious arguments in favor of financial integration as an engine of
growth (like the well-known risk-sharing argument, see Acemoglu and Zili-
botti, 1997), recent papers more concerned with welfare considerations have
identified cases against capital mobility by stressing a possible negative effect
on the level of consumption. In particular, Boucekkine et al. (2012) (see also
Boucekkine and Pintus, 2012) have shown that collateral-constrained bor-
rowing is welfare-increasing provided the growth rate of the economy under
autarky (that’s prior to liberalization) is large enough. Again the latter con-
dition features a kind of threshold below which financial liberation worsens
welfare, as in the empirical literature on growth and globalization quoted
above.
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While the latter threshold arguments do not constitute per se a case for
capital controls, they do open the door for alternative managements of cap-
ital flows. More explicit arguments in favor of capital control can be found
in the related and so called new welfare economics literature surveyed by
Gallagher (2012). Along this line of research, key contributors are Korinek
and Jeanne (see Korinek, 2011, and Jeanne and Korinek, 2010). The main
idea is that free capital flows generate negative (pecuniary) externalities that
should be corrected by a Pigouvian tax mechanism; capital controls play ex-
actly this role (as they could be modeled, for instance, as taxes levied on
capital inflows). In Korinek (2011), the externality acts through exchange
rate fluctuations, which are only internalized at the central planner level.
On the contrary, in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012), the externality comes
from pegging the nominal exchange rate in a small open economy subject to
downward nominal wage rigidity, which is supposed to describe the actual
picture in countries like Greece. This peg-induced externality is shown to
cause unemployment, over-borrowing, and depressed levels of consumption.
In such a situation, optimal capital control policy should be procyclical ac-
cording to these authors: it should restrict capital inflows in good times and
subsidize external borrowing in bad times.
In this paper, we take an intermediate step and consider a second-best
optimum problem in which a central planner takes the decisions of the repre-
sentative agent as given and has to decide whether and when to use capital
controls modeled as a tax on capital inflows. Borrowing in international mar-
kets at the international interest rate (small open economy assumption) helps
financing public expenditures which are assumed to increase the welfare of
the economy. But depending on initial conditions (like the initial debt stock)
and borrowing conditions, resorting to financial markets without further reg-
ulation may lead to non-desirable paths for public debt and ultimately harm
consumption and welfare. This is likely to make a case for optimal capital
controls in a second-best context. We study the problem using a two-stage
optimal control technique first proposed by Tomiyama (1985) and already
applied to a variety of optimal switching problems (for optimal technology
adoption problems, see Boucekkine et al., 2004 and 2011, and Saglam, 2011).
An application to the optimal implementation of capital controls is suggested
in Makris (2001). We elaborate on the latter contribution to build a broader
second-best optimization problem allowing to discuss the optimality and tim-
ing of capital controls in the light of the most recent related developments in
the theory of capital controls mentioned above.
In particular, three important features will be carefully highlighted. First
of all, we shall show that our two-stage optimal control technique yields
quite naturally explicit thresholds values (related to the initial values of
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debt stocks, international interest rates, local technologies...etc) determin-
ing whether it is optimal or not to run capital controls, and when a country
should start liberalizing capital flows. In this sense, our theoretical findings
are perfectly consistent with the above mentioned “thresholds” literature
(Kose et al., 2009, Aizenman et al., 2011, and Boucekkine et al., 2012). Sec-
ond, our set-up allows to analyze to which extent the cycle (as measured by
an exogenous flow of income) affects the decision to keep on using capital
controls or to allow for full capital liberalization. Third, by incorporating
endogenous welfare-enhancing public expenditure, we are able to evaluate
to which extent the presence of this ingredient shapes the optimal capital
control policy.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the second-
best problem, section 3 solves the problem with exogenous public expendi-
tures, section 4 examines an extension where the latter increases welfare.
Finally section 5 concludes.
2 The problem
The second-best problem extends the one suggested by Makris (2001).
It models a small open economy trading foreign assets in an international
financial markets at a constant interest rate θ > 0 (only foreign assets are
internationally traded). Initially, the government levies a tax τ(t) > 0 on
the returns to foreign assets acquired by domestic agents (capital inflows).
The resulting income is divided between public expenditures g(t) and the
payment of the interests on public debt, h(t). The government has to deal
with the budget constraint:
h˙ = θh+ g − τa (1)
with h0 ≥ 0, the initial debt stock, given. a(t) is private wealth.1 Last but
not least, we abstract away from any potential uncertainty and information
asymmetry in what follows. This is clearly a benchmark but as we will show
along the way, this is enough to make the three points announced in the
introduction.
The representative agent derives utility both from public and private good
consumption. She takes the policy (that is, the variable g and τ) as given
1Precisely, private wealth a(t) consists of public debt and private holdings of foreign
assets. But since only the latter are internationally tradable, equation (1) holds at equi-
librium.
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and solves the problem of maximizing∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
c1−
1
σ
1− 1
σ
+ α
gβ
β
)
dt (2)
with ρ > 0, the discount rate, β < 1, σ < 1, subject to the following budget
constraint:
a˙ = (θ − τ)a+ y − c (3)
with a0 ≥ 0 given and y > 0 an exogenous flow of income. As outlined in
the introduction, the exogenous variable y can be taken as a close indicator
of the economic cycle and as the state of production technology as well. An
additional technical comment is in order here. One has to observe that the
problem of the representative agent is not well-posed whatever the position
of the international interest rate with respect to the discount rate. Indeed,
from the representative household’s program, one gets the standard Euler
equation:
c˙ = σ(θ − ρ− τ)c,
meaning that consumption growth at rate σ(θ − ρ − τ) for any t. For the
objective function of the agent’s problem to be asymptotically bounded, fur-
ther parametric conditions have to imposed. If we assume as usual that the
net of tax rate of return must be non-negative, that is τ(t) ≤ θ, then full
liberalization (τ(t) = 0) may not be asymptotically sustainable when ρ > θ
under σ < 1. We shall therefore impose θ ≥ ρ. 2
Let us describe now our second-best problem. In our second best economy,
the government takes the decisions of the representative agent (captured by
the Euler equation above) as given and chooses the sequence of tax rates and
public expenditures so as to maximize the welfare of the agent. Regarding
the choice of the tax rates sequence, we specifically formulate an optimal
timing problem consistently with multi-stage optimal control (Tomiyama,
1985). The government has the choice between full liberalization (τ = 0) and
capital controls (0 < τ ≤ θ). We virtually assume that the government starts
with the latter and has to decide whether she switches to the second regime
with τ(t) = 0 for all t ≥ t1. t1 is therefore a decision variable. Needless to
say, the corner solution t1 = 0 may be optimal, in such case the government
has to choose to liberalize capital flows from t = 0. So, the government’s
2Makris (2001) takes θ = ρ and α = 0. The former is not needed in this case.
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program consists in maximizing (2) with respect to {g(t), τ(t), t1} subject to
·
a = (θ − τ)a+ y − c
·
h = θh+ g − τa
c˙ = σ(θ − ρ− τ)c
τ ≤ θ, a0, h0 given
(4)
In our problem, 0 < τ ≤ θ in the time interval [0, t1) and τ = 0 after t1.
Hereafter, we shall refer to the economic regime chosen before t1 (Resp. af-
ter t1) as regime 1 (Resp. regime 2). Accordingly regime 1 is the capital
controls regime while regime 2 refers to full liberalization. The induced op-
timization problem involves a standard optimal switching time choice, and
it can be therefore treated with the multi-stage optimal control proposed by
Tomiyama (1985) as explained just below. We start with the case where
public expenditures are exogenous.
3 Optimal policy under exogenous public ex-
penditures
Consider the government’s problem with α = 0 and g ≥ 0, an exogenous
(constant) flow of public expenditures. Define x(t) as the vector of state
variables, that are assumed to be continuous functions with first derivatives
piecewise continuous on R: x(t) = (a(t), h(t), c(t)) with corresponding law
of motions f ix(x(t), τ(t)) in regime i = 1, 2. Let D be the control region
in regime 1: D = (0, θ]. τ(t) is assumed to be piecewise continuous on D.
The necessary conditions for (x∗(t), τ ∗(t), t∗1) to be an optimal solution are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 There exist real numbers λi0 and a vector of continuous
functions λix(t), i = 1, 2, x = a, h, c, where λ
1
x(t) (resp. λ
2
x(t)) is piecewise
differentiable for all t ∈ [0, t1] (resp. for all t ∈ [t1,∞)), such that:
Define the current-valued Hamiltonian of regime i, i = 1, 2, as
H i(x(t), τ(t),λix(t)) = λ
i
0U(c(t)) + [λ
i
x(t)]
Tf ix(x(t), τ(t)),
and the current-valued Lagrangian as
Li(x(t), τ(t),λix(t), pi(t)) = H
i(x(t), τ(t)λix(t)) + pi(t) (θ − τ(t))
with pi(t) ≥ 0 for all t, the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier. Then,
1/ λi0= 0 or 1 and (λ
i
0,λ
i
x(t)) is never (0,0),
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2/ λic(0) = 0,
3/ For all τ in D:
∂H1(x(t), τ(t),λix(t))
∂τ
5 0,
(
∂L1(x(t), τ(t),λix(t))
∂τ
= 0
)
, pi(t) = 0 and pi(t) (θ − τ) = 0,
4/ Let H i∗(t) be the maximized Hamiltonian: H i∗(t) =
H i(x∗(t), τ ∗(t),λix(t)), the functions λ
i
x(t) satisfy λ˙
i
x(t) = ρλ
i
x(t) − ∂H
i∗(t)
∂x(t)
for x = a, h, c.
5/ We have x˙∗(t) = ∂H
i∗(t)
∂λix(t)
for x = a, h, c.
6/ Suppose t∗1 <∞. If t1 > 0 then it must hold that
λ1x(t
∗
1) = λ
2
x(t
∗
1) for x = a, h, c and H
1∗(t∗1) = H
2∗(t∗1). (5)
Otherwise, t1 = 0 and limt∗1→0H
1∗(t∗1) ≤ limt∗1→0H2∗(t∗1). The transversality
conditions are given by limt→∞ e−ρtλ2x(t)x(t) = 0 for x = h, c, a.
7/ Assume now that t∗1 =∞. Then, limt∗1→∞H1∗(t∗1) ≥ limt∗1→∞H2∗(t∗1).
The transversality conditions are lim→∞ e−ρtλ1x(t)x(t) = 0 for x = h, c, a.
Except Conditions 2/, 6/ and 7/, the first-order conditions displayed
above are completely standard. Condition 2/ is quite unusual: it is indeed
the transversality condition induced by the fact that the initial value of a
state variable, namely consumption, is free. Conditions 6/ and 7/ are the
necessary conditions regarding the optimal switching time problem. They
have been essentially developed by Tomiyama (1985). In particular, (5) are
the necessary conditions for an interior optimal time switching to occur.3
At the optimal t1 > 0, the co-state variables are all continuous. Moreover,
the Hamiltonian should be also continuous at t1. The latter is indeed the
optimality condition for an optimal interior t1 to occur. The rest of conditions
stated in 6/ and 7/ are immediate necessary (non sufficient) conditions for
the corner solutions t1 = 0 (immediate full liberation) and t1 = ∞ (no full
liberalization at all) to hold. The corresponding economic interpretations
are also immediate. For example, Condition 7/ delivers that if the optimal
regime is capital controls for ever, then total welfare under this regime is
always bigger than under full liberalization for large enough time horizons.
We shall now use the explicit specifications of our problem to develop the
conditions above. For our particular problem, the necessary optimality con-
ditions include (when there is no risk of confusion, regime and time indexes
3See detailed proofs in Tomiyama (1985).
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are dropped for convenience):
pi = −((λh + λa)a+ λcσc)
λ˙a = (ρ− θ + τ)λa + τλh
λ˙c = (ρ− σ(θ − ρ− τ))λc + λa − c− 1σ
λ˙h = (ρ− θ)λh
(6)
Let us write the necessary condition with respect to the switching time
t1 corresponding to (5), given that τ(t) = 0 for t ∈ (t1,∞) and that both the
co-state and state variables are continuous at t1 (their levels being denoted
by hats):
H1(t1) =
cˆ1−
1
σ
1− 1
σ
+λˆa [(θ − τ(t1))aˆ+ y − cˆ]+λˆcσ[θ−ρ−τ(t1)]cˆ+λˆh
[
θhˆ+ g − τ(t1)aˆ
]
H2(t1) =
cˆ1−
1
σ
1− 1
σ
+ λˆa [θaˆ+ y − cˆ] + λˆcσ[−ρ]cˆ+ λˆh
[
θhˆ+ g
]
Thus, H1(t1) = H
2(t1) is equivalent to:
τ(t1)(σλˆccˆ+ λˆaaˆ+ λˆhaˆ) = 0 (7)
If τ(t1) > 0, then it imposes pi(t1) = −(σλˆccˆ+ λˆaaˆ+ λˆhaˆ) = 0.
From now on, consider the case τ(t1) > 0 implying pi(t1) = 0: the gov-
ernment stops taxing capital when the constraint on the tax rate becomes
unbinding. We argue that pi(t1) > 0 for all t < t1 that is, the constraint is
binding till t1: τ(t) = θ for all t ∈ (0, t1).
If 0 < t1 <∞ exists, then the economy will end up in regime 2 with τ = 0.
The system (6) can easily be solved for each regime taken separately that is,
for the first regime valid for all t ∈ [0, t1], where τ = θ, and for the second
one, valid for t ∈ (t1,∞) with τ = 0. Then, we can use the set of boundary
conditions (a0, h0, λc(0) = 0 because c(0) is free and the continuity of c, h, a
and their co-states at t1) to obtain the equation that defines the optimal
switching time:
σρ
σρ+ θ
[a0 + y(θ
−1 + t1)] = [a0 + θ−1(y − g)− h0]
1− (1−σ)θe−σρt1σρ+θ(1−σ)
1 + σθe
−(θ+σρ)t1
σρ+θ(1−σ)
 (8)
This leads to the following result:
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Proposition 3.2 i/ A necessary condition for the existence of 0 < t1 <∞
is
θ
θ + σρ
(
a0 +
y
θ
)
> h0 +
g
θ
. (9)
ii/ In the special case where y = 0, this condition, that reduces to θ
θ+σρ
a0 >
h0 +
g
θ
, is also sufficient.
The proof is in the Appendix.
Some conclusions can immediately be drawn from proposition 3.2. The
likelihood of a switch to the regime of full liberalization of capital movements
stems from the comparison between on the one hand, the sum of the initial
debt and the discounted flows of future expenditure and on the other hand,
the sum of initial wealth and the discounted flows of future income where
discounting is made using the interest rate. Resources should be sufficiently
larger than expenses for the government to start liberalizing capital flows
at some point in time. Indeed, the second regime of full liberalization be-
comes worthwhile only when the public debt has turned into an asset. This
finding is consistent with Kose et al. (2009)’s conclusion that stopping cap-
ital control is desirable only if some measure of total wealth, defined as the
sum between initial wealth and discounted flows of income, is above some
threshold. Incidentally, our compact switching condition entails some other
plausible implications. For example, a large initial debt h0 makes full lib-
eralization sub-optimal, which is somehow consistent with Aizenman et al.
(2011) findings on the bad performance of countries with high short term
debt ratio during the crisis period. On the other hand, when a country
can count on a large enough initial stock of domestic private assets (that’s
a0), switching to full liberalization can be (second-best) optimal. Also, our
switching condition can be used to discuss the optimal policy depending on
the cycle. Indeed, one can rewrite condition (8) for any given exogenous path
of income, y(t), t ≥ 0. Although our analysis is limited in such a case by the
absence of uncertainty, some preliminary lessons can be extracted. In partic-
ular, our second-best analysis suggests that booms should stimulate financial
liberalization while recessions should rather lead to push for capital controls.
This contrasts with the prudential use of capital controls recommended by
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012) in their model with exchange rate pegging
and downward wage nominal rigidity. Our setting is of course minimal but
we believe it is interesting to notice than in such a benchmark, second-best
capital control policies should rather be countercyclical.
Last but not least, our optimal switching condition depends on both the
interest rate and the preference parameters, and therefore one can examine
to which extent the second-best policy is sensitive to these parameters. As to
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the interest rate, note that it is equal to the tax rate before the switch. An
increase in θ implies both a more costly debt service and higher tax revenues.
Hence, its effect on the opportunity to switch is ambiguous. Regarding the
impact of the other parameters, it turns out that the higher the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution and the discount rate, the less likely is the
liberalization of capital flows. Under the regime of capital control, optimal
consumption is decreasing because there is no point in accumulating assets
whose returns are fully taxed. The higher the intertemporal elasticity and
the larger the discount factor, the steeper this decrease and the higher initial
consumption. Tax revenues are then lower and it is less likely that a regime
switch occurs.
Finally, we examine the possibility of corner solutions to be optimal.
Typically this occurs when Condition (9) no longer holds. This question is
treated in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.3 i/ The corner solution t1 = 0 (full liberalization from
t = 0) is always sub-optimal.
ii/ If Condition (9) does not hold, the corner solution t1 =∞ is optimal.
Along this solution, consumption converges to zero.
The proof is in the Appendix. The first property of the model is rather
good news. Because full liberalization only increases debt given the way this
regime is modeled in this model (τ = 0), applying it on a permanent basis
leads to sub-optimal explosive dynamics ceteris paribus. This is largely con-
sistent with the empirical literature (see Aizenman et al., 2011, for example)
which points out the negative impact of liberalization precisely through this
bias. In contrast, the empirical literature emphasizes the positive impact of
liberalization, notably in developing countries, when it operates through a
substantial increase in FDIs. We don’t have such a channel in our simplis-
tic model. Concerning the second corner solution, that’s permanent capital
controls, it turns out to be optimal when the switching condition does not
hold, which happens when intertemporal expenditures exceed intertemporal
income of the economy (symmetrically to our interpretation of (9)). Because
optimal capital controls lead to choose τ = θ, the optimal consumption rule,
considered as a constraint in our second-best problem, implies that con-
sumption goes to zero asymptotically (while the objective function of the
optimization problem is still bounded despite σ < 1, see the Appendix).
Again this extreme property derives from the simplicity of our benchmark
and the second-best setting adopted. But the whole exercise examplifies the
effects of permanent full liberalization Vs capital controls in the case where
liberalization only operates through financial inflows, resulting in an increas-
ing debt, and capital controls show up through linear taxation schemes.
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4 Optimal policy under endogenous public
expenditures
Let us now consider g as a control variable of the government. In order
to simplify the computations, we set y = 0. As one can see from Proposition
(??) ii/ under exogenous public expenditures, the switching conditions are
qualitatively the same in this case as when y > 0. So we can analyze the
impact of endogenizing public expenditures under y = 0 without loss of
generality. The optimization program reads
max
g,τ,t1
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
c1−
1
σ
1− 1
σ
+ α
gβ
β
)
dt
subject to (4). The necessary conditions are similar to (6). In addition, the
optimization with respect to g yields:
g(t) = g(λh(t)) with g(λh(t)) =
(
−λh(t)
α
) 1
β−1
The necessary optimality condition (7) related to the optimal switching
time t1 is unchanged and, under the same argument as before, we can claim
that during the regime of capital controls the government sets the tax rate
at the maximum possible level that is, τ = θ for all t ≤ t1. It is pretty
easy to solve the dynamic system for the two possible regimes. Given that
λh(t) = λ¯he
(ρ−θ)t, the general solution under the first regime of capital control
is:
λa(t) = λa1e
ρt − λhe(ρ−θ)t
λc(t) = λc1e
ρ(1+σ)t + λ¯h
θ+ρσ
e(ρ−θ)t + (c
− 1σ
1 −λa1)
σρ
eρt
c(t) = c1e
−σρt
a(t) = a1 + yt+
c1
σρ
e−σρt
h(t) = h1e
θt + a1 + y(θ
−1 + t) + (β−1)g(λ¯h)e
ρ−θ
β−1 t
ρ−βθ +
θc1
σρ(σρ+θ)
e−σρt
Under full liberalization (τ = 0), solutions are given by
λa(t) = λa2e
(ρ−θ)t
λc(t) = λc2e
(ρ(1+σ)−θσ)t − λa2−c
− 1σ
2
σρ+θ(1−σ)e
(ρ−θ)t
c(t) = c2e
σ(θ−ρ)t
a(t) = a2e
θt − y
θ
+ c2
σρ+θ(1−σ)e
σ(θ−ρ)t
h(t) = h2e
θt + (β−1)g(λ¯h)e
ρ−θ
β−1 t
ρ−βθ
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When a change in policy occurs in finite time (0 < t1 < ∞), the second
regime is the terminal one. Suppose θ > ρ. Then the transversality condi-
tions impose λc2 = a2 = h2 = 0. In addition, it must be true that ρ > β.
In this situation, both consumption and private assets tend to +∞ as time
goes to infinity. Since β < 1, we also have the public debt going to minus
infinity. This is an irrelevant solution that could have been prevented from
the initial statement of the problem by requiring the non-negativity of the
public debt asymptotically (like a No-Ponzi game condition). To do things
in a much simpler way, we set ρ = θ herafter: the interest rate is equal to
the discount rate. As a consequence, it appears that both the co-state of
the public debt λh and public expenditures are constant over time. Direct
calculations reveal that if a 0 < t1 <∞ exists then it solves
σa0
1 + σ
1 + σe−θ(σ+1))t1
1− (1− σ)e−σθt1 = a0 −
g(λh(t1))
θ
− h0. (10)
This equation is similar to (8) with ρ = θ, y = 0 and g = g(λh(t1)) defined
above. With exogenous public spending, one was able to solve the system
of state variables separately from the system of co-states and to obtain the
simple equation (8) defining the existence of the optimal t1. This is no longer
the case because the amount of public good provided by the government now
depends on the co-state of the public debt. So, it is necessary to solve
the system of co-states in order to derive the expression of λh(t1). After
straightforward computations, one gets:
λh(t1) =
1 + σ
σ
(σθa0)
− 1
σ (1− (1− σ)e−σθt1) 1+σσ
(1− σ)e−θ(1+σ)t1(1− eθ(1+σ)t1)− (1 + σ)e−θt1 , (11)
with, c1(t1) = σθa0(1+(σ−1)e−σθt1)−1. Hence, we can establish the following.
Proposition 4.1 A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of
0 < t1 <∞ is
a0
1 + σ
> h0 +
1
θ
[
(1 + σ)(σθa0)
− 1
σ
ασ(1− σ)
] 1
β−1
. (12)
The proof is in the Appendix.
This result is generally in the line with the outcomes of our analysis of the
exogenous public expenditures case. Assuming ρ = θ and y = 0, condition
(9) reduces to a0
1+σ
> h0 +
g
θ
. Similarly, condition (12) can be rewritten as
a0
1+σ
> h0 +
gmin
θ
, with gmin =
[
(1+σ)(σθa0)
− 1σ
ασ(1−σ)
] 1
β−1
the lower value g(λh) can
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reach since it corresponds to the limit of g(λh(t1)) when t1 tends toward in-
finity and ∂g
∂λh
∂λh
∂t1
< 0. Therefore, the decision to liberalize capital revenues
at some point in time is dictated by the gap between initial wealth and the
sum of the initial debt and the discounted flows of minimal future public
expenditures, where discounting is made using the interest rate. However,
gmin is endogenous, driving other effects of the fundamental parameters of
the model. In particular, it increases with the initial tax rate (that is the
international interest rate in this case) and the sensitivity of utility with re-
spect to public expenditures. In other words, the higher these parameters,
the less likely the switch in finite time to full financial liberalization. More-
over, the minimum level of public expenditures also positively depends on
initial wealth. As a result the total impact of a0 is now unclear: a wealthier
country is more likely to be able to afford capital control elimination for a
given level of public expenditures. But, due to the endogenous g, higher a0
translates into higher public expenditures, which reduces the desirability of
financial liberalization. It can easily be shown that it is only for interme-
diate wealth levels that a switch to a regime with no taxation may occur.
A very important conclusion of this exercise is then to qualify substantially
one of our findings under exogenous public expenditures. In this case, the
richer the country in terms of private assets (that is a0), the more prof-
itable the switch to full liberalization at a given finite optimal date. When
public expenditures are chosen in order to maximize social welfare, things
are more complicated: financial liberalization is not unaffordable only for
poor countries, even wealthy countries might find it optimal to implement
capital controls if they aim to keep a large (optimally chosen) amount of
public expenditure. In other words, the preservation of the welfare states in
rich countries (say the current industrialized countries) might require a more
frequent use of capital controls.4
4Note that when condition (12) is not verified, we necessarily have a corner solution.
Once again, the corner solution where the government liberalize capital movements from
the period t = 0 is not relevant. From the boundary conditions, it must hold that h0 =
−g(λh)/θ, which cannot be true as long as the initial stock of debt in the economy is non
negative. So, as in the case of exogenous public expenditures, the only alternative to the
regime where the government switches from full capital control to full liberalization is the
regime of permanent capital control that is, the regime where τ = θ lasts forever. The
dynamic and asymptotic behavior of the economy can thus be derived from the analysis
of the corner of the preceding section by simply substituting ρ and y respectively with θ
and 0 in the solution and noticing that the value of λh, and consequently g(λh), exists iff
a0 > h0 and is uniquely and implicitly given by the system g(λh) = θ(a0 − h0 − cˆθ(1+σ) )
and cˆ−
1
σ = − σλh1+σ with cˆ the constant of integration of consumption.
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5 Concluding remarks
We have solved a benchmark second-best problem where a government has in
particular to choose whether to tax financial inflows (capital controls) or not,
and when. We have done the job having in mind the recent developments
in the empirical and theoretical literature on financial liberalization. In par-
ticular, we have taken care of three important aspects. First of all, we have
analytically highlighted the existence of thresholds (on initial debt, on ini-
tial wealth...etc) above or below which capital controls are optimal. Second,
we have shown that second-best capital controls should be used counter-
cyclically: booms should be responded by more financial liberalization while
recessions should rather lead to push for more stringent capital controls. Last
but not least, we have found that even wealthy countries might find it op-
timal to implement capital controls if they aim to keep a large amount of
public expenditure.
Clearly enough, our model is too simple in several respects, and some
essential ingredients have to be added to make it more relevant given the
recent trends. In particular, adding FDIs as an essential form of liberalization
is a necessary step to take consistently with the data. This addition might
significantly alter some of the conclusions reached in this paper.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Part i/ Denote the LHS of (8) by F (t1). This function has the following
features: F (0) = σρσρ+θ (a0 + y/θ) > 0, F (∞) = +∞ and F (t1), F ′(t1) > 0 for
all t1 > 0. Let G(t1) be the RHS. This function verifies: G(0) =
σρ
σρ+θ (a0 +
y
θ −
σρ+θ
σρ+(1−σ)θ (h0 +
g
θ )) and G(∞) = a0 + θ−1(y− g)− h0 <∞. A necessary condition
for existence is a0 + θ
−1(y − g) − h0 > 0. Otherwise, G(t1) < 0 for all t1. Under
this condition, one has G(t1), G
′(t1) > 0 for all t1 > 0. A comparison between
these boundary values yields: F (0) > G(0) and F (∞) > G(∞). Hence, it is clear
that if F (0) > G(∞), which is equivalent to θθ+σρ
(
a0 +
y
θ
)
< h0 +
g
θ , there is no
solution. Thus, (9) is a necessary condition for existence (condition (9) implies
that a0 + θ
−1(y − g)− h0 > 0).
Part ii/ Now, take y = 0. The LHS of (8) is now constant and equal to θθ+σρa0.
Let H(t1) be the simplification of G(t1) with y put equal to 0. One has H(0) =
σρ
σρ+θ (a0− σρ+θσρ+(1−σ)θ (h0+ gθ )) and H(∞) = a0−θ−1g−h0. A necessary condition for
existence is a0 − θ−1g− h0 > 0. If this condition holds, then H(t1), H ′(t1) > 0 for
all t1 > 0 and a necessary and sufficient condition for existence is H(∞) > θθ+σρa0,
which is equivalent to θθ+σρa0 > h0 +
g
θ .2
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Proof of Proposition ?? It should be clear that a corner solution with τ = 0 for
all t is not possible. To see this, note that in this case h(t) = −gθ for all t and the
boundary condition h0 = −gθ does not hold in general. Let us now consider the
case τ = θ for all t, the general solution reads: c(t) = cˆe−σθt, a(t) = aˆ+ yt+ cˆe
−σθt
σρ
and h(t) = aˆ + y(t + θ−1) − gθ−1 + θcˆe−σθtσρ(σρ+θ) for the state variables and, for the
co-states: λa(t) = −λh(t), λh(t) = λˆhe(ρ−θ)t and λc(t) = λˆhe(ρ−θ)tσρ+θ + cˆ
− 1σ eρt
σρ where
cˆ = (θ+σρ)(a0+θ
−1(y−g)−h0) which is assumed to be positive even when (9) does
not hold, aˆ = − θa0−(θ+σ)(h0+θ−1(g−y))σρ and λˆh = − (θ+σρ)
1− 1σ (a0+θ−1(y−g)−h0)− 1σ
σρ . To
sump up, in a regime of permanent capital control, consumption asymptotically
goes to zero whereas both the private and public assets tend toward infinity because
of the permanent flow of exogenous income y > 0. In the particular case where
y = 0, consumption still converges to zero but now a and h achieve constant values
respectively given by: a(∞) = − θa0−(θ+σ)(h0+θ−1g)σρ > 0 and h(∞) = −θ−1g +
a(∞) Q 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Denote the LHS of (10) by J(t1). J(.) > 0 is monotonically decreasing with
J(0) = a0 and J(∞) = σa01+σ . Let f(t1) be the RHS. This function is defined in
terms of λh(t1), whose expression is given by (11), with λ
′
h(t1) < 0 for all t1. In
addition λh(0) = −(θa0)− 1σ and λh(∞) = −1+σσ (σθa0)
− 1σ
1−σ . From the definition of
f(t1), this in turn implies that f
′(t1) > 0. Since f(0) < J(0), a necessary and
sufficient condition for the existence of a 0 < t1 < ∞ is f(∞) > J(∞), which is
equivalent to (12). 2
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